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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIA~f B. I\1ASON, 
Plaintiff an.d Respondent, 
-vs.-
WAYNE N. MASON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8198 
Respondent's Brief 
STATE1\'IENT OF FACTS 
This action arose out of a sale by the Government 
of thirteen 40 acre tracts of land in Boxelder County. 
Both William B. ?\Iason, Respondent, and Wayne N. 
Mason, Appellant, claimed a preferential right to pur-
chase the land. After various proceedings before the 
Bureau of Land Management, it finally determined that 
six of the 40 acre tracts should be awarded to the appel-
lant and seven to the respondent. After patents issued, 
the respondent brought this action to have the court 
determine that the Bureau of Land Management had 
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misapplied the law, and that the appellant held the six 
tracts a'varded to him in trust for respondent. The trial 
court awarded three additional 40 acre tracts to respon-
dent, and Wayne Mason appealed. Appellant contends 
that the trial court should not have disturbed the decision 
of the Bureau of Land Management. The Respondent 
takes the position that under the applicable federal 
~tatutes, none of the 13 tracts should have been awarded 
to the appellant, and urges this court, by way of cross-
appeal, to award all 13 tracts to him. 
The Statement of Facts by the appellant is not com-
plete, and we deem it necessary to make a more detailed 
presentation. The court should note at the outset that 
the lands in question 'vere offered for sale under a.uthor-
i ty of Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, 
( 43 U.S.C. 1946 Edition, Supplement 4, Section 1171), 
which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to sell at 
public auction isolated or disconnected tracts of the 
public domain. The statute then expressly provides: 
''For a period of not less than 30 days after 
the highest bid has been reeeiYed, any owner or 
o"Tners of contiguous land shall have a prefer-
ence right to buy the offered land at such highest 
bid price, and "~here t\vo or more persons apply 
to c_}xercise such preference right, the Secretary 
of the Interior iR authorized to make an equitable 
division of the lands among such applicants.'' 
rrhe application for the publie sale of the lands here 
involved was made by respondent. (J1Jx. P-10). Pursuant 
'to that application, the lands were offered for sale Sep-
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tember 28, 1949, (Ex. P-10) .. At that sale the appellant 
made the high bid of $2.05 per acre, (Ex. P-10). On 
October 11, 1949, respondent claimed his preferential 
right to purchase all of the land and submitted payment 
therefor. (Ex. P-10). Since the preferential right to 
purchase is based on the O\vnership of land contiguous 
to the public lands we reproduce here a map (Ex. P-6) 
which sho\vs the land ownership. 
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The thirteen 40 acre tracts are sho,vn in the center 
in 'vhite. The respondent is the owner of the Wm. B. 
:Yiason Ranch (colored blue). It 'vill be noted that the 
William B. ~{ason Ranch abuts this land along the entire 
\vest side, with the exception of one 40 acre tract, which 
is colored in dark red. It is this one 40 acre tract upon 
which the appellant based his claim for a preferential 
right to purchase (Ex. P-10). It 'vill also be noted that 
along the entire north and east sides the public tracts in 
question are surrounded by the national forest and lands 
owned by the State of Utah. The only other contiguous 
private land was owned by Jesse Lamb, and it abuts the 
public tract on the south. Lamb 'vas not an interested 
bidder. 
' ·, 
At the time of the public sale ther.e was in effect a 
Regulation, 43 Code Federal Regu~tion~,. 295.11, which 
in part provided : 
'' (b) * * * Such preferential right is not ex-
tended to ~he owner or owners of cornering lands. 
"(1) A preference right to pur~hase must be 
supported by proof of the claimant's ownership 
of the whole title to the contiguous land (that is 
he must sho"r that he had the 'vhole title in fee) 
and must be accompanied by the purchase price 
of the land.'' 
At the time the application for public sale 'vas made 
by respondent he o\vned all of the land shaded in blue 
in Exhibit P-6 (R. 57). The national forest lands are 
rather effectively separated from the tracts being offered 
for sale by rough terrain, and in the normal operation 
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of the lands cattle "rould not move from these tracts to 
and from the forest, (R. 81). Glen Mason, whose lands 
are shown in ·Exhibit P -6, only had lands which ''cor-
nered'' with the public lands. Under the above regula-
tion he 'vould not have been a preferential bidder, and 
as indicated, neither Glen l\1ason nor Lamb asserted any 
interest. At the time of the application for public sale 
by respondent the appellant owned no land 'vhatever in 
this area. On September 24th, four days prior to the 
date of the sale, appellant received a quitclaim deed, 
from one Nish, to a 40 acre tract 'vhich abutted one of 
the thirteen tracts being offered for sale, as is shown by 
Exhibit P-6, (R. 67). At the time Mr. Nish gave appellant 
the quitclaim deed he did not hold fee title to the land, 
but was merely acquiring the same under a contract of 
purchase from Union Life Insurance Company, (R. 67, 
68, 69). The deed did not issue from the Union Life In-
surance Company to Nish until October 4, 1949, 6 days 
after the sale, (Ex. 4). On September 24th, Nish still 
owed $450.00 on the land. Wayne Mason, appellant, 
loaned l\Ir. Nish the payment (R. 67-69), and Union Life 
Insurance Company executed a deed conveying title to 
this 40 acre tract to Mr. Nish on October 4, 1949, (Ex. 
P-4). Mr. Nish continued to hold the deed from Union 
Life Insurance Company until March of 1950, at 'vhich 
time he executed a new deed to Wayne lVIason, (Ex. 
D-13). 
The 40 acre tract acquired in the manner set forth 
above by the appellant from Mr. Nish was of rather low 
economic value. Marcellus Palmer, who qualified as a 
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land use expert, testified that this particular laud was 
gravelly and required considerable moisture in order to 
gro\v forage, (R. 83-84). Neither the 40 acre tract ac-
quired by appellants, nor the lands being offered for 
sale, had any "'ater supply, either for irrigation or for 
stock watering purposes, ( R. 80, 81). The land can be 
used for grazing for a period of approximately three 
months of the year and will support one C0\\7 for each 
fifteen acres. ( R. 84-85). Thus, on the 40 acre tract 
acquired by appellant, he could have run only three head 
of cattle for a period limited to three months of each 
year and he had no \Vater supply on the land for any 
such cattle, (R. 88-89); nor \vas there any water on any 
of the land being offered for sale, ( R. 80-81-88-89). There 
was water on the lands O\vned by William B. Mason and 
on lands owned by Lamb. William Mason and Lamb 
operated their cattle in common and they could utilize 
the public lands for grazing (R. 91). There was \Vater 
on the national forest, but it was not available to these 
lands because of rough terrain. ( R. 81). 
The parties hereto are brothers and the ranch now 
owned by the respondent was acquired by their father 
and is known as the William B. Mason Ranch, (R. 127). 
The appellant had operated this ranch for a very sub-
stantial period of time, and during that time had filed 
homestead applications on part of these 13 40-acre tracts, 
(R. 127). He admitted that \Vhen he used the William 
B. Mason ranch, these tracts were used with it, and the 
ranch and these tracts were oper~ ted as a unit, ( R. 128). 
The homestead applications \vere not perfected (R. 113-
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114). vVilliam B. Mason made his primary living from 
the ranch (R. 98). It was upon this scene that the ap-
pellant interjected himself by getting a quit claim deed 
to a 40 acre tract four days before the public sale from 
a man "vho did not have fee title. It should also be noted 
that the lands have such a low economic use (three cows 
per 45 acres per season) as to make it uneconomic to 
fence the lands (R. 86). It should also be noted that by 
awarding the particular six tracts on the south end to 
Wayne ~1ason, it effectively prevented vVilliam 1\!ason 
from getting from his ranch to the 640 acre school sec-
tion, (R. 91-92) "vhich he now leases (R. 61). 
When both of the parties hereto asserted preferen-
tial rights, the Regional Administrator of the Colorado-
Utah Region, Bureau of Land Management, determined 
that appellant should be permitted to purchase the one 
40 acre tract directly abutting the 40 acres quit claimed 
to him. Upon this basis the manager of the Salt Lake 
Office on April 13, 1950 issued a formal decision appor-
tioning the public tracts between appellant and respon-
dent on the basis of 12 tracts to respondent and one to 
appellant, (Ex. P-10). An appeal was taken to the direc-
tor of. the Bureau of Land Management on September 
12, 1950, and the director affirmed the twelve to one 
apportionment. Wayne 11ason then took an appeal to 
the head of the department. The department head re-
versed the prior decisions, attempted to apportion the 
land equally bet,veen the parties and thus six of the 40 
acre tracts were given to the appellant and seven to the 
respondent, (Ex. P-10). The opinion written by Mastin 
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G. White, Solicitor for the Department, ruled that the 
statute above set forth requiring an ''equitable division'' 
of the land required that it be destributed "equally". 
At the time of the sale, a department regulation ( 43 
C.F.R. 250.11-b-3) interpreted the statute, providing that 
"the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to make an 
equitable division of the lands among such applicants," 
to mean that the ''administrator will make a determina-
tion equally apportioning the various subdivisions among 
the claimants''. Thereafter this interpretive regulation 
was amended so that at the time of the trial the inter-
pretive regulation read as follo,vs: 
'' (b) Preference right of purchase; declara-
tion of purchaser. * * * 
'' ( 3) Where there is a conflict bet,veen t'vo or 
more persons claiming a preference right of pur-
. chase, they 'vill be allowed 30 days from receipt 
of notice within which to agree among themselves 
upon a division of the tracts by subdivisions. In 
the absence of an agreement an equitable division 
of the land will be made taking into consideration 
such factors as (i) the equalizing of the number 
of acres 'vhich each claimant 'vill be permitted to 
purchase, ( ii) desirable land use, based on topog-
raphy, land pattern, location of 'vater, and similar 
factors, and (iii) legitimate historical use, includ-
ing construction and maintenance of authorized 
improvements. If equitable consideTations dictate 
all of the subdirisions may be awarded to one of 
the claimants. Where only one subdivision is of-
fered for sale and it adjoins the lands of two or 
more preference right claimants, it 'vill, in the 
absence of equitable considerations requiring 
otherwise, be a'varded to the applicant for the 
sale if he is a qualified person who properly 
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asserts such a preference right within or prior to 
the 30-day preference-right period. The manager 
will make the a'vard by declaring the appropriate 
claimant or claimants purchasers of the land. 
(R.S. 2478, 43 U.C.S. 1201) 
'' J nne 4, 1953. '' 
DOUGLAS McKAY 
Sec.retary of the Interior 
The factual considerations 'vhich induced the trial 
court to make the award of three tracts to appellant and 
ten to respondent are set forth in Finding No. 8. 
The trial court concluded that it was not equitable 
"\vithin the meaning of the governing federal statute to 
a pportiou the lands equally under the facts of this case, 
but that it was equitable to apportion the lands ten to 
the respondent and three to the appellant. The Court 
went on to state: 
"* * :¥., that such an allotment gives both individuals 
a way into lands owned by the State of Utah in Section 
36 and to the National Forest (Ex. P -6) ; that plaintiff 
is the owner of the "\Vater customarily used, and the only 
"\Vater readily available for use with the public lands 
offered for sale (R. 80, 81) ; that the defendant o'vns no 
water on any tract near the lands offered for sale (R. 
80, 81), and there is no 'vater on the lands being offered 
for sale; that historically the lands now being offered 
ior sale have been used in connection with the lands now 
owned by the plaintiff (R. 127); that the plaintiff o'vns 
considerable land, as is described above, in the immediate 
vicinity of the lands offered for sale (Ex. P-6); that 
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the defendant owned only a 40 acre tract 'vhich was quit 
claimed to him only four days prior to the sale (R. 67) 
and some forest permits, which are separated by a rough 
terrain from the lands offered for sale (R. 81); that the 
plaintiff operates his cattle in common with others in 
the area; that the only water available for grazing these 
lands, other than the water owned by plaintiff, is located 
on the lands of the others with whom plaintiff operates 
(R. 81); that the lands have value primarily for grazing 
purposes ( R. 84, 85) ; that such historical use as the de-
fendant had in connection with these lands was at a time 
when he was the owner of the lands now owned and 
operated by the plaintiff (R. 127); that the lands, be-
cause of their limited forage, are not of sufficient value 
to make it economic to fence them and that these factors 
and the location of the particular lands of the plaintiff 
in relationship to the lands offered for sale make it 
equitable to award 10 of the 13 40-acre tracts to the 
plaintiff; that the forest permits and the one 40 acre 
tract owned by the defendant make it equitable to a'vard 
three of the 40 acre tracts to the defendant; that the 
lands owned by the State of Utah in Section 36 were at 
the time of the sale leased to the defendant, but at the 
time of the trial were leased by the plaintiff; that these 
lands could be utilized through such an award of these 
public lands by either of the parties, if either of them 
should continue to lease or in the future should purchase 
said state lands." 
10 
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STATE~1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. rrHE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDIC-
TION IN THIS CASE. 
POINT II. WAYNE MASON WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TU ANY PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PUR-
CHASE ANY OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION. 
POINT III. ''EQUITABLE DIVISION'' AS RE-
QUIRED IN SECTION 2455 OF THE REVISED 
STATUTES, AS AMENDED (43 U.S.C. 1946 Ed. 
Supp. 4, Sec. 1171) DOES NOT MEAN "EQUAL 
DIVISION.'' 
The questions 'vill be discussed in the order sug-
gested in the foregoing Statement of Points. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I .. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDIC-
TION IN THIS CASE. 
Johnson vs. Towsley, 80 U. S. 72, 13 Wall 72, 30 L. 
Ed. 485, is a square United States Supreme Court case 
involving the very same department as is involved here, 
to wit, the Land Department. There the Land Depart-
ment had issued a patent to the defendant. The plaintiff 
claimed that the patent should have been issued to him, 
exactly as the plaintiff is doing here. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari from a State Supreme 
Conrt decision and squarely held that the state court 
11 
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had the power to correct the misapplication of the law 
by the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Land l\Ianagement. The opinion of the Court stated, 
in part, as follows : 
'' That the action of the Land Office in issuing 
a patent for any of the public land, subject to sale 
by pre-emption or otherwise, is conclusive of the 
legal title, must be admitted under the principle 
above stated, and in all courts, and in all forms 
of judicial proceedings \vhere the title must con-
trol, either by reason of the limited powers of 
the court, or the essential character of the pro-
ceeding, no inquiry ran be permitted into the cir-
cumstances under 'vhich it "~as obtained. On the 
other hand, there has always existed in the courts 
of equity the power in certain classes of cases to 
inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice and 
wrong, in both judicial and executive action, how-
ever solemn the form "l'hich the result of that 
action may assume, when it invades private rights; 
and by virtue of this power the final judgments 
of courts of law have annulled or modified, and 
patents and other important instruments issuing 
from the Crown, or other executive branch of the 
Government, have been corrected or declared void, 
or other relief granted. No reason is perceived 
V\rhy the action of the Land Office should constitute 
an exception to this principle. * * * 
''And so, if for any other reason recognized 
by courts of equity, as a ground of interference 
in such cases, the legal title has passed from the 
United States to one party, 'vhen, in equity and 
good conscience, and by the laws which Congress 
has made on the subject, it ought to go to another, 
'A court of equity \vill,' in the language of this 
court in the case of Starks v. Starrs, just cited, 
12 
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'convert him into a trustee of the true owner, and 
compel him to convey the legal title. * * * 
" ... it is fully conceded that when those (land} 
officers decide controverted questions of fact, in 
the absence of fraud or imposition or mistake, 
their decision on those questions is final, except 
as they may be reversed on appeal in that de-
partment. But we are not prepared to concede 
that when in the application of the facts as found 
by them, they, by misconstruction of the law, take 
from a party that to which he has acquired a legal 
right under the sanction of those laws, the courts 
are "rithout power to give any relief. * * * 
''This court has at all times been careful to 
guard itself against an invasion of the functions 
confided by law to other departments of the gov-
ernment, and in reference to the proceeding before 
the officers intrusted 'vith the charge of selling 
the public lands it has frequently and firmly re-
fused to interfere with them in the discharge of 
their duties, either by mandamus or injunction, 
so long as the title remained in the United States 
and the matter was rightfully before those officers 
for decision. On the other hand, it has constantly 
asserted the right of the proper courts to inquire, 
after title has passed from the Government, and 
the question became one of private right, whether, 
according to the established rules of equity and 
the acts of Congress concerning the public lands, 
the party holding that title should hold absolutely 
as his own, or as trustee for another.'' 
This principle has also been clearly recognized by 
the Utah Supreme Court. In the case of Warren Trr. Co. 
v. Charlton, et a.Z., 58 Utah 113, the Utah court quoted 
(page 123) 'vith approval from the case of Moore v. Rob-
bins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. Ed. 848, where the court held 
13 
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that 'vhen mistake or fraud or misconstruction of the 
law of the case exists, the United States, or any con-
testing claimant for the land, may have relief in a court 
of equity; and S·rnelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26 
L. Ed. 875, which held that if in the issuing of a patent 
the officers of that department take mistaken views of 
the law, or draw erroneous conclusions from the evi-
dence, or act from either imperfect views of duty or 
corrupt motives, the party aggrieved cannot set up such 
matters in a court of law to defeat the patent. He must 
resort to a court of equity, where he can obtain relief, 
if his rights are injuriously affected by the existence of 
the patent, and he possesses such equities as will control 
the legal title vested in the patentee. See also Steele v. 
Allison, 33 Southwest 2nd, 842. 
POINT II. WAYNE MASON WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ANY PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PUR-
CHASE ANY OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION. 
The lands in question, consisting of thirteen 40 acre 
tracts, were offered for sale as isolated tracts under the 
provisions of Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as 
amended. ( 43 U.S. 0.1\. Sec. 1171.) The pertinent portion 
of that statute is quoted above and is requoted here for 
convenience. 
Section 2455 in part provides : 
"* * * it shall be lawful for t~ Secretary of 
the Interior to order into market and to sell at 
public auction * * * any isolated or disconnected 
tract or parcel of the public domain not exceeding 
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one thousand five hundred and twenty acres which, 
in his judgment, it would be proper to expose for 
sale * '*' *; Provided, that for a period not less 
than thirty days after the highest bid has been 
received, any owner or owners of continguous land 
shall have a preference right to buy the offered 
lands at such highest bid price, and where two or 
more persons apply to exercise such preference 
right the Secretary of the Interior is authorized 
to make an equitable division of the land among 
such applicants. * * * '' 
This is the language of the section in effect at the 
time of the sale in question. 
In 43 Code of Federal Regulations, 250.11, it 1s 
provided: 
''(b) Preference right of purchase; declara-
tio,n of purchaser. The owners of contiguous lands 
have a preference right, for a period of 30 days 
after the highest bid has been received, to pur-
chase the land offered for sale at the highest bid 
price or at three times the appraised price if three 
times such appraised price is less than the highest 
bid price. Such preference right may also be 
asserted at any time prior to the commencement 
of such period. Such preference right is not ex-
tended to the owner or owners of cornering lands. 
'' ( 1) A preference right to purchase must be 
supported by proof of the claimant's ownership 
of the 'vhole title to the contiguous lands (that is, 
he must show that he had the whole title in fee), 
and must be accompanied by the purchase price 
of the land. '' 
There have been numerous cases in which a person 
with less than the fee title has asserted a preference, 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the preference has been disallowed. It seems to be 
the settled interpretation of the statutes that a person, 
in order to assert the preference, must have the fee title, 
and that merely holding a contract of purchase or the 
equitable title is not sufficient. 
In the following appeals to the head of the Depart-
ment of Interior it has been held that anything less than 
the whole fee title is not sufficient upon which to base 
a preference: In the case of Louise Olson, Raymond V. 
Wagner, A-24143, February 16, 1943, unreported, one 
who asserts a preference right to purchase an isolated 
tract must own the complete fee title. In this case, the 
claim of preference was rejected on the ground that the 
applicant was merely a ''joint o"\vner'' of the contiguous 
land. However, it was later granted on a showing that 
he was acting on behalf of a partnership. In the case of 
James L. McCreath, Vera Row, A-23942, October 13, 
1944, unreported, although an applicant is permitted to 
assert his preference right claim prior to the date of sale, 
such as by the assertion of adjoining land ownership in 
the public sale application, he must, of course, continue 
to be a. contiguous owner in fee at the time of the sale. 
It is clear under Utah la"T that Wayne Mason was 
not the owner of any contiguous land either at the date 
of the sale or at any period within 30 days thereafter. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that Wayne 1\fason has 
no other land except the 40 acres which were quit claimed 
by 1\fr. Nish. On September 24th, the only thing Nish 
owned 'vas a contract under which he was purchasing 
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the land in question. At that time he gave Wayne ~Iason 
a quit claim deed. The quit claim deed could not pass to 
\Vayne Mason anything more than Nish owned. When 
Nish subsequently acquired the legal title between Octo-
ber 4th and October 8th, this title would not pass from 
Nish to Wayne Mason, because a quit claim deed will 
not pass an after acquired title. Wayne ~Iason, of course, 
recognized this and sometime during March of the fol-
lowing year got a new deed from Nish. 
It seems to us, therefore, that the evidence requires 
a holding that Wayne Mason received a quit claim deed 
from a man who did not have the fee title; and that he 
did not get the fee title from Mr. Nish until March of 
1950, nearly six months after the sale. Since he was not 
the owner of ·contiguous land on September 28, 1949, or 
within 30 days thereafter, Wayne Mason was not en-
titled, under the statute, to a preference. If he had no 
preference, all of the land, as a matter of law, should 
have been sold to William Mason, who admittedly did 
have a preference. 
The cases to the effect that a quit claim deed will 
not pass an after acquired title are extremely numerous. 
See, for example, 26 C.J.S. Deeds, Section 118 on page 
416, where it is stated that a quit claim deed will convey 
'vhatever title 
''Or interest the grantor may have in the land 
at the time it is given and only such title or in-
terest and excludes any implication that he has 
any title or interest. * * * Of course, a quit claim 
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deed given at a time when the grantor has no title 
or interest ·does not convey anything, although it 
may operate as a contract to convey the title or 
interest subsequently acquired. * * * '' 
''An after acquired title by the grantor will 
not, as a general rule, inure to the benefit of the 
grantee under a quit claim deed. So a quit claim 
deed not purporting to convey any particular in-
terest will not convey a possible future interest 
of the grantor.'' 
In Nix v. Tooele County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P. (2d) 
376, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"Plaintiff's title is founded upon quit claim 
deeds. Such deeds do not imply the conveyance 
of any particular interest in property. (Citing 
statutes) Plaintiffs acquired only the interest of 
their grantors, be that interest what it may." 
Also to this effect see 26 C.J .S. Deeds Section 105, 
page 385, which states that a deed which does not mani-
fest a contention to convey after acquired title will not 
be construed to so do. 
''Where the language is clear and unambigu-
ous and there is no intention apparent from the 
instrument to convey after acquired property or 
title, the deed will not be construed as a convey-
ance thereof. In order to convey an after acquired 
interest, it is necessary either specifically to men-
tion the intention of the grantor so to do or to 
make such recitals as will preclude him from 
thereafter disputing the full force and effect of 
his conveyance. * * * '' 
The abstracts of title (Ex. 1, 2, 3) clearly show that 
William l\1ason \Yas the owner of several contiguous 
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tracts at the time of the sale and during the entire 30 
day period thereafter. He testified that he asserted his 
preferential rights and paid the money. (R. 62). The 
decisions of the Department also recite that he asserted 
his preference and paid the money (Ex. P-10). Since he 
'vas the only ''owner of continguous land'' within the 
meaning of the Federal statute, he is the only person 
entitled to a preference, and is the only person who 
should have been permitted to purchase any of the 
lands in question. 
POINT III. ''EQUITABLE DIVISION'' IN SECTION 
2455 OF THE REVISED STATUTES, AS 
A}IENDED ( 43 U .S.C. 1946 Ed. Supp. 4, Sec. 1171) 
MEANS "JUST OR FAIR DIVISION." 
The statute in question, Section 2455, expressly says 
that: 
'' * * * 'vhere t'vo or more persons apply to 
exercise such preference right the Secretary of 
the Interior is authorized to make an equitable 
division of the land among such applicants. 
It is our contention that the distribution here made 
was not equitable. The record shows that the Depart-
ment of the Interior treated the term "equitable" as 
though it meant "equal". The Department, therefore, 
gave Wayne Mason six 40 acre tracts and William lVIason 
seven 40 acre tracts. The seventh went to William ~Iason 
because he initiated the sale proceedings. 
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There was at the time the sale was consummated 
an administrative regulation in effect which provided 
as follows: ( 43 C.F.R. 250.11 (b) 3) 
''Where there is a conflict between two or 
more persons claiming a preference right of pur-
chase, they will be allowed 30 days from receipt 
of notice within which to agree among themselves 
upon a division of the. tracts in conflict by sub-
division. In the absence of an agreement the 
regional administrator will make a determination 
equitably apportioning the various subdivisions 
among the claimants, ordinarily so as to equalize 
as nearly as possible the tracts they should be 
permitted to purchase. * * * '' 
Since the hearing, a new Federal regulation has 
been adopted. The regulation now in effect provides as 
follows: 
''Section 250.11 (b) ( 3) is amended to read as 
follows: 
'' § 250.11 Action at close of bidding. 
* * * 
(b) Preference right of purchase; declaration 
of purchaser. * * • 
' ' ( 3) Where there is a conflict between two or 
more persons claiming a preference right of pur-
chase, they 'vill be allowed 30 days from receipt 
of notice within which to agree among themselves 
upon a. division of the tracts by subdivisions. In 
the absence of an agreement an equitable division 
of the land will be made taking into consideration 
such factors a.s ( i) the equalizing of the number of 
acres which each claimant will be permitted to 
purchase, ( ii) desirable land use, based .on topog-
raphy, land pattern, location of water, and similar 
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factors, and (iii) legitimate historical use, includ-
ing construction and maintenance of authorized 
improvements. If equitable consirl erations dictate 
all of the subdivisions may be awarded to on.e of 
the claima.nts. Where only one subdivision is of-
fered for sale and it adjoins the lands of two or 
more preference right claimants, it will, in the 
absence of equitable considerations requiring 
other,vise, be awarded to the applicant for the 
sale if he is a qualified person who properly 
asserts such a preference right within or prior to 
the 30-day preference-right period. The manager 
will make the award by declaring the appropriate 
claimant or claimants purchasers of the land. 
"R.S. 2478, 43 U.S.C. 1201) 
''June 4, 1953.'' 
DOUGLAS McKAY 
Secretary of the Interior 
We think that it is important to note that these 
administrative regulations are nothing more than ad-
ministrative "guesses" as to what the statute means. 
There has been no amendment to the statute. It is the 
statute 'vhich gives to the parties their rights. The De-
partment of the Interior is simply an administrator to 
see that the rights granted by the statute are given to 
the parties. The statute itself no'v provides and has at 
all times rna terial to this suit provided that : 
'''X: =i-:= * 'vhere two or more persons apply to 
exercise such preference right the Secretary of 
the Interior is authorized to make an equitable 
division of the land among such applicants.'' 
The issue is : What is the meaning of this statutory 
language~ The administrative regulations interpreting 
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this statute represent only the Department's interpreta-
tion or "guess" at what the statute means. They have 
made at least two guesses as to its meaning. One of the 
guesses is contained in the regulation quoted first above, 
and is also quoted by the Solicitor in his opinion. The 
Department's present ''guess'' at what the language 
means is set forth in the second regulation quoted above. 
The Department's present opinion of the meaning of 
the statute is that "equitable" requires the Department 
to take into consideration the nature of the past useage, 
the topography, the water holes, the land holdings of each 
individual and permits the awarding of all the acreage 
to one of the parties if such would be equitable. 
There is a square Utah Supreme Court opinion sup-
porting our contention that these Department regulations 
are nothing more than administrative guesses as to the 
meaning of the statute. The statute mea.ns the same now 
as it did when it wa.s enacted. The statute is not changed 
by erroneous administrative interpretations. This was 
very well stated by the Utah Supreme Court in a recent 
case entitled Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 107 Utah 24, 151 P. ( 2d) 467. In that case the Su-
preme Court said at page 32: 
''An administrative interpretation out of har-
mony and contrary to the express provisions of 
the statute can not be given weight. To do so 
would in effect amend the statute. Construction 
may not be substituted for legislation.'' 
The Utah Supreme Court cited Manhattan General 
Equipment Company v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
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enue, 297 U. S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397, in support of its holding 
and quoted with approval the following: 
''The power of an administrative officer or 
Board to administer a Federal statute and to 
prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not 
the power to make law * * * but the power to 
adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of 
Congress as expressed by the statute. A regula-
tion which does not do this, but operates to create 
a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere 
nullity, and not only must a regulation, in order 
to be valid, be consistent 'vith the statute, but it 
must be reasonable.'' 
The United States Supreme Court case involved a 
new regulation which was in harmony with the Federal 
statute. One of the parties who relied on an earlier 
regulation contended that the new regulation could not 
be retroactively applied to him. The court said: 
''The contention that the new regulation was 
retroactive is without merit, since the original 
regulation could not be applied, the amended regu-
lation in effect became the primary and controlling 
rule in respect of the situation presented. It point-
ed the way; for the first time, for correctly apply-
ing the antecedent statute to a situation which 
arose under the statute. * ':~ * The statute defines 
the rights of the taxpayer and fixes a standard by 
which such rights are to be measured. The regu-
lation constitutes only a step in the administrative 
process. It does 'not, and could not, alter the sta-
tute. 'X:**'' 
Our Utah Supreme Court then went on to state: 
''The case stands clearly for the doctrine that 
when an administrative tribunal makes an 'initial 
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guess' as to "\vhat effect a statute has, that guess 
is not to any extent binding on the courts or upon 
the administrative tribunal which made said 
erroneous guess. When a new regulation is passed 
or "\vhen the statute is for the first time considered 
by the courts, it seems clearly correct to state 
that the new rulings are not retroactive, but that 
they are in fact but the first correct application 
of the law." 
This holding was later followed by the Utah Su-
preme Court in the case of New Park Min.ing Cornpany 
v. Tax Commission, decided in 1948, 113 Utah 410, 196 
P. (2d) 485. The Utah.Supreme Court stated: 
''Even if there were an administrative inter-
pretation such as plaintiff asserts, this court could 
not permit such an interpretation to stand in flat 
contradiction to the clear terms of the. statute." 
Thus, both the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court have unequivocally stated that 
administrative interpretations of statutes are nothing 
more than administrative guesses about the meaning of 
the statute. The two Federal regulations quoted above 
are nothing more than that. The administrator has taken 
two "guesses" at what the statute means. Like the 
United States Supreme Court said in the case quoted 
above, ''it is the statute ~vlzich gives. to the pa.rties their 
rights.'' The administrative officer is charged with ad-
ministering those rights. In the ordinary course of ad-
ministration, the administrative officer must take the 
first ''guess'' at what the statute means. Unless his 
"guess" is in harmony with the statute, it is as the Utah 
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Supreme Court has said, a ''mere nullity''. Here the 
administrator passed one regulation which interpreted 
the word "equitable" to mean "equal". He subsequently 
took another ''guess'' at the statute and said the word 
"equitable'' means that all of the land can be passed to 
one individual if in consideration of historical useage, 
acreage holding, topography, "~ater, etc., it 'vas equitable 
to do so. If any weight whatever is to be given to these 
administrative ''guesses'', we submit that the Depart-
ment's present interpretation of the statute should be 
given the greater weight. 
Basically, however, as the Utah and United States 
Supreme Courts have stated, the meaning of a statute is 
a judicial question and no "\Veight is given to administra-
tive interpretations unless they are in harmony with the 
statute. Interpretations out of harmony are nullities. 
In the instant case, there can hardly be any doubt 
that it is not equitable to give Wayne Mason six of the 
thirteen 40 acre tracts. From a standpoint of historical 
use, all parties admit that all thirteen tracts of the land 
in question "\vere used as a unit " 7ith the William Mason 
Ranch. Wayne :Nlason, 'vho at one time owned the Wil-
liam :l\iason Ranch, operated the t\\'O as a unit. Before 
and since he sold the William 1\tlason ranch to the plain-
tiff's predecessors in title, and they to the plaintiff, the 
lands have been operated as a unit. The only water 
\vhich is available for use is located on William Mason's 
private land. The topography is such that the lands can 
best be used by William Mason. In land acreage Wayne 
1fason has one 40 acre tract which he bought at the very 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time of the sale for the sole purpose of interjecting him-
self into this picture. He has no water. His 40 acres 
of private land would only sustain three cattle for 
three months. The other users in the area have operated 
in common with their stock. They have large holdings, 
and they have had water at either end of their range, and 
it is indispensable to their operation that they be able 
to cross over some of the 40 acre tracts awarded by the 
administrator to Wayne Mason. It is not equitable to 
let Wayne 1\{ason, who has no historical use, no water, 
no other lands that have been used jointly with these, 
to come in and take half the land and make a nuisance 
of himself in the middle of an established livestock 
operation. Whatever past historical use Wayne Mason 
had in connection with these lands, he had at a time 
when he was the owner of the William Mason ranch, and 
any historical considerations passed to William Mason 
when he purchased that ranch. 
Any reference to a dictionary will demonstrate that 
the word "equitable" does not mean "equal". Black's 
Law Dictionary gives the following definition of '' equit-
able": 
''Just; conformable to the principles of justice 
and right. 
"Just, fair, and right, in consideration of the 
facts and circumstances of the individual case. 
''Existing in equity; available or sustainable 
only in equity, or only upon the rules and princi-
ples of equity." 
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Black's law Dictionary gives the following definition 
of "equal": 
''Alike ; uniform; in the same plane or level 
with respect to efficiency, 'vorth, value, amount, 
or rights.'' 
''Equitable'' is defined in 30 C.J.S., page 297 as fol-
lows: 
''Commonly defined to mean according to the 
principles of equity or characterized by equity or 
fairness ; fair and just; marked by due considera-
tion for what is fair, unbiased or impartial; reas-
onable or right. * * * 
"Equal" is defined in 30 C.J.S., page 292 as follows: 
"as a verb: To make equivalent to, or to 
answer in full proportion, to recompense fully. 
''As an adjective : The word generally refers 
to size or quantity, meaning like or same; even, 
sameness of quantity or degree, the same. * * * '' 
In the case of Van Horn v. Van Horn, 119 P. 21, 825, 
189 Oklahoma 624, the Court 'vas concerned with the dif-
ference between the words "equitable" and "equal". 
It was a case in which a decree of divorce made no pro-
vision as to the division of property, which pursuant to 
an Oklahoma statute 'vas to be divided equitably. Of 
this the Court said : 
'' 1\.nother rule which seems to have been vio-
la ted by this decree and 'v hich is bonding on the 
Court irrespective as to whether the divorce is 
granted to the husband or to the wife, is that the 
defendant is entitled to a fair and equitable divi-
sion of the property acquired during the marriage. 
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(Citing cases) This equitable division referred to 
in these decisions does not necessarily mean an 
equal division of the property, but means what it 
says, an equitable division. * ~· * 
"The rule is that a Court of equity in granting 
a divorce is required by statute to make a just and 
fair as well as an equitable division of the prop-
erty. In doing so it is not required that the prop-
erty be divided equally, but there should be a wife 
latitude as to ho\v much shall be given to each.'' 
See also the cases of Hughes v. Hughes, 177 Okla-
homa 614, 61 P. 2d 556, and Van· Schaick v. Astor, 274 
N.Y.S. 322. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court had jurisdiction to inquire into 
and correct errors committed by the Bureau of Land 
Management where such errors arose from misconstruc-
tion of the lavv and \vhere they prejudiced private rights. 
At the time of the above mentioned sale, and for 
more than 30 days thereafter, Wayne Mason did not own 
fee title to any lands contiguous to the isolated tracts 
here in controversy, and thus was not entitled to a pref-
erence right to purchase any of such tracts under the 
provisions of Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as 
amended. The District Court erred in holding that 
Wayne J.\tiason did have such a preference right. 
"Equitable Division," in Section 2455 of the Revised 
Statutes, as amended, means a division 'vhich is "just, 
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fair, and right, in consideration of the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case.'' The District Court was 
correct in holding that the Bureau of Land Management 
erred in construing ''equitable division'' to mean ''equal 
division." 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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